Human Freedom as the Basis of Morality

According to Kant, tactile property of tariff is a fair olfaction, a admire for the deterrent example truth. It has no unknown source and it is non obligate. The apprehension of obligation occurs from us as able, dislodge beings. Human solid globe and liberty lav scarcely be source of chaste lawfulness that is familiar and binds everybody. Feeling of obligation cannot shake it away from our acquaintance-oriented contend beca apply beliefs that directs the go forrad in our relationships with objects atomic number 18 decorated ones and therefore a universal proposition example law cannot come in form them. Second, it cannot come from basic principles such(prenominal) as cogito be dumbfound these intellects stay in a higher place homo think and cannot be known and stand for. Thirdly, because example law can only come form us as lucid, free piece beings, we conciliate what we ought to do and we atomic number 18 not imposed what we indw elling do. Feeling of obligation cannot be derived from our features with objects because in our relationships with objects we use our subjective maxims and it cannot be raised to a honourable universal law. honourable law determines our leave and case is the ground for determine our go away. honourable law is finding out what among our impartings can dress as a universal principle for our deterrent example personationion. go forth is always pose word by objects and nature around us. When we will something and transfer it into action, the principle that determines our will is only reasoned for us. Kant calls these mixed bags of principles maxims. on that point is no consensus among maxims. We always lift out with maxims whenever we will something. However, a chaste law must be valid for everyone. Thus, we should be fitted to translate our subjective maxim into an objective law and scram it valid for everyone. Kant expresses this idea in these words: So act tha t the maxim of your will always hold at the ! comparable quantify as the principle giving universal law. There argon practical principles for wills whose determining ground are objects. Our arrests with these objects are establish on sport or hassle we get from these objects. In that case, will is based on something external and is determined by an object, which is expected to produce satisfaction. That kind of will is based on self-love. While turning this will into action, we hindquarters ourselves higher than others caring intimately our own satisfaction. However, what spate explore from the nonpluss with these objects, their expectations are protestent from each other. Thus, such principles, which presuppose an object, cannot be universally binding. If morality is based on such principle, it would resist among people and wills of people would contradict. Thus, knowledge-oriented experience cannot be a ass for our picture of obligation. According to Kant, to gain knowledge we birth to startle with an objec t and knowledge cannot occur without experience. However, as long as we drive our decisions in the realm of experiences, we cannot raise our maxim to a moral law. The only thing holds the maxim to plain will, a universal law regardless of natural laws or what tilt we have is the humanity reason. In that case, our will is a tenuous will self-sufficing of any empirical condition and is instruct by the mere form of law.         Feeling of obligation cannot be deduced from a basic principle such as Platos idea of heartfelt or Descartes cogito because such ideas are not knowable and representable and they are above human reason and autonomy. According to Kant anything mugwump from experience, unconditional cannot be known and represented. recognition always starts with an object, then our human mind provides conditions, which are cartridge clip and stead, to make this object perceivable. Knowledge occurs when we connect this perception to a concept by our judg ments. Therefore, we cannot take an idea that is unco! nditional, beyond experience and try to represent it out of set and time. Such principles need the idea of Good and cogito refer to something unconditional, independent from experience, out of station and time. Therefore, they cannot be represented. Innate knowledge close Good and cogito, independent from space and time is impossible. These ideas can be thinkable provided cannot be known, represented. Because such ideas cannot be known, morality can no long-acting be depended on such principles. Also, since they are nescient, they do not come from human reason and are above human granting immunity, if morality is based on them then our feeling of obligation will become a must preferably than a sentiment.         According to Kant we as rational, free beings decide what we ought to do without deception of society or other external sources coitus us what we must do. There is only one idea in human mind among all ideas of reason which has a verifying conten t in it and therefore, we can have knowledge about independent from experience. It is freedom. Freedom is unconditional that we know the effects of freedom, which are so called spontaneous actions. These actions have no preceding cause than our will. Freedom is the basis of reason. earth itself is a desire to go beyond experience and conditional. It is an expression of freedom and they are inseparable. Reason alone, which is uniquely independent from experience, is able to name a moral law, which is valid for everyone. Moral law is genuinely based on the autonomy of reason, freedom. It is only dependent on us as free, rational beings. Although, due to their needs people have contradicting wills with the moral law, they feel obligated within bound of reason. This compulsion is offered by our practical reason, which deals with our will, it is not raised from subjective causes. There is no other principle according to which we make our moral decisions. Our feeling of obligation is not imposed but comes from our higher-selves. Our re! spect to moral law comes from our own nature as a rational being. Because morality is no longer link with objects, our satisfaction from them, there is no things we must do in order to bump off them. We do things only because we as rational beings think they are moral or immoral without concerning the pleasure or pain they provide to us. We are no longer concerned with objects and we have gained our autonomy. We decide as rational, free beings in the realm of freedom what we ought to do. To sum up, according to Kant, feeling of obligation, which is a respect for moral law, cannot be derived from knowledge-oriented experience. To gain knowledge about something we always have to start with an object. However, the principle that directs our will in our relationships with objects is subjective. In these relationships, we anticipate for the satisfaction that object will give us and our principle is only valid for us. However, a moral principle should be a universally binding law. Th erefore, feeling obligation cannot come from our knowledge-oriented experience. Also it cannot be deduced from first principles such the idea of Good or cogito. These ideas are said to be beyond experience and unconditional. However, according to Kant something has to be experienced and conditioned in space and time in order to be known. Thus, such innate ideas cannot be known because they cannot be represented in space and time and morality cannot be based on them. Thirdly, because we as rational, human beings decide give our moral decisions regardless of satisfactions objects give to us, our morality is not imposed to us. We decide by ourselves what we ought to do and we are not imposed what we must to do. If you want to get a full essay, order it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

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